COMMAND
	PoPToP PPTP server remote buffer overflow
SYSTEMS AFFECTED
	Versions older than 1.1.4-b3 and 1.1.3-20030409 affected
PROBLEM
	Timo Sirainen [tss(at)iki(dot)fi] found following:
	PPTP-over-IPSEC is commonly used to create  VPNs.  Windows  plays  quite
	nicely with it.
	PPTP packet header contain 16bit length which specifies  the  full  size
	of the packet:
	
		bytes_this = read(clientFd, packet + bytes_ttl, 2 - bytes_ttl);
		// ...
	        bytes_ttl += bytes_this;
		// ...
		length = htons(*(u_int16_t *) packet);
		if (length > PPTP_MAX_CTRL_PCKT_SIZE) {
		  // abort
		}
	
	Looks good so far, except:
	
		bytes_this = read(clientFd, packet + bytes_ttl, length - bytes_ttl);
	
	If given length was 0 or 1, the "length - bytes_ttl"  result  is  -1  or
	-2, which means that it reads unlimited amount of data from client  into
	"packet", which is a buffer located in stack.
	The exploitability only depends on if libc allows the size parameter  to
	be larger than SSIZE_MAX bytes. GLIBC does, Solaris and *BSD don't.
	 tips of the day
	 ---------------
	Don't do arithmetic in parameters specifying buffer size.
	Block PPTP port for non-IPSEC connections, if you don't already.
SOLUTION
	 patch
	 -----
	This is the same as in latest versions:
	
	--- ctrlpacket.c.old	1999-12-23 23:43:33.000000000 +0200
	+++ ctrlpacket.c	2003-04-09 18:58:21.000000000 +0300
	@@ -254,8 +254,8 @@
	 	}
	 	/* OK, we have (at least) the first 2 bytes, and there is data waiting */
	 	length = htons(*(u_int16_t *) packet);
	-	if (length > PPTP_MAX_CTRL_PCKT_SIZE) {
	-		syslog(LOG_ERR, "CTRL: Control packet > PPTP_MAX_CTRL_PCKT_SIZE (length = %d)", length);
	+	if (length <= 10 || length > PPTP_MAX_CTRL_PCKT_SIZE) {
	+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "CTRL: 11 < Control packet (length=%d) < ", length);
	 		/* we loose sync (unless we malloc something big, which isn't a good
	 		 * idea - potential DoS) so we must close connection (draft states that
	 		 * if you loose sync you must close the control connection immediately)